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[ writeup · case #029 ]

DNS

All 9 flags live in DNS records on the enitt.online zone — no web exploitation. The names are protocol- and record-type-themed, reached by guessing DNS/email-security concepts or by following the DNS graph: MX target, CNAME chain, SRV pivot.

date
2026-10-11
read
4 min
tags
#ctf #recon #dns #osint
event
Securinets ENIT — Cat the Flag v3
category
recon
points
620
placement
1st place

TL;DR

All 9 flags live in DNS records on the enitt.online zone — there is no web exploitation. The site sits behind Cloudflare and serves nothing useful. The names are not in common subdomain wordlists; they are protocol-defined / record-type-themed names you reach either by guessing DNS/email-security concepts or by following the DNS graph (MX target, CNAME chain, SRV pivot).

#NameVectorFlag
1_dmarcDMARC record (RFC 7489)SecurinetsENIT{m41l_p0l1cy_w34k}
2mailtarget of the MX recordSecurinetsENIT{mx_h1dd3n}
3portal → verify-2 → finalCNAME chainSecurinetsENIT{cn4m3_ch41n}
4_caaCAA-themed nameSecurinetsENIT{c44_4u7h0r17y_l1m173d}
5_dnssecDNSSEC-themed nameSecurinetsENIT{dn55ec_n07_3n4bl3d}
6_axfrzone-transfer-themed nameSecurinetsENIT{20n3_7r4n5f3r_bl0ck3d}
7_verifyDNS-verification-themed nameSecurinetsENIT{b451c_dn5_r3c0n}
8authSRV-record pivot themeSecurinetsENIT{5rv_r3c0rd_p1v07}
9_acme-challengeACME DNS-01 (RFC 8555)SecurinetsENIT{5ubd0m41n_hun7_c0mpl3t3}

Decoy: _dkim → realistic-looking but fake DKIM record (no flag).


Recon setup

Direct HTTP(S) to the site is blocked/stalled by Cloudflare, but DNS resolution works fine. All queries were made over DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) so no local dig/jq is required:

bash
# one helper
q() { curl -s "https://dns.google/resolve?name=$1&type=$2"; echo; }

Key type numbers used: TXT=16, A=1, CNAME=5, MX=15, NS=2, SRV=33, CAA=257, TLSA=52.

First look at the apex:

bash
q enitt.online TXT   # v=spf1 -all        (strict SPF, no flag)
q enitt.online MX    # 10 mail.enitt.online   <-- lead #1
q enitt.online NS    # carl/ivy.ns.cloudflare.com
q enitt.online HTTPS # Cloudflare SVCB/ECH, no flag

The -all SPF and Cloudflare NS tell us: email-security themed, hosted on Cloudflare, flags hidden in records rather than the website.


The hint, decoded

This points at three families of names:

  1. Real RFC underscore records — _dmarc, _acme-challenge, (_domainkey, _mta-sts, _smtp._tls...).
  2. Invented-but-themed underscore concepts — _caa, _dnssec, _axfr, _verify.
  3. Records you reach by following DNS, not fuzzing — the mail MX target, the portal → verify-2 → final CNAME chain, and the auth SRV-pivot name.

The winning move is a parallel DoH scan over a wordlist built from DNS record types + email/DNS-security concepts (each tried as both x and _x), across several record types.


Flag-by-flag

1 — _dmarc → m41l_p0l1cy_w34k

Classic DMARC record. The flag is embedded inside the rua reporting address:

bash
q _dmarc.enitt.online TXT
# "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:SecurinetsENIT{m41l_p0l1cy_w34k}@dmarc.enitt.online"

2 — mail → mx_h1dd3n

The apex MX record points to mail.enitt.online; query that name's TXT:

bash
q enitt.online MX           # 10 mail.enitt.online
q mail.enitt.online TXT     # SecurinetsENIT{mx_h1dd3n}

3 — portal → verify-2 → final → cn4m3_ch41n

portal is a CNAME; follow the chain to the end. Each hop carries the same flag in TXT:

bash
q portal.enitt.online   CNAME   # verify-2.enitt.online
q verify-2.enitt.online CNAME   # final.enitt.online
q final.enitt.online    TXT     # SecurinetsENIT{cn4m3_ch41n}

4 — _caa → c44_4u7h0r17y_l1m173d

bash
q _caa.enitt.online TXT   # SecurinetsENIT{c44_4u7h0r17y_l1m173d}

5 — _dnssec → dn55ec_n07_3n4bl3d

bash
q _dnssec.enitt.online TXT   # SecurinetsENIT{dn55ec_n07_3n4bl3d}

6 — _axfr → 20n3_7r4n5f3r_bl0ck3d

bash
q _axfr.enitt.online TXT   # SecurinetsENIT{20n3_7r4n5f3r_bl0ck3d}

7 — _verify → b451c_dn5_r3c0n

bash
q _verify.enitt.online TXT   # SecurinetsENIT{b451c_dn5_r3c0n}

8 — auth → 5rv_r3c0rd_p1v07

Themed on the SRV-record "service pivot" idea; the flag sits in TXT:

bash
q auth.enitt.online TXT   # SecurinetsENIT{5rv_r3c0rd_p1v07}

9 — _acme-challenge → 5ubd0m41n_hun7_c0mpl3t3

The ACME DNS-01 validation name — the author's "you've found them all" marker:

bash
q _acme-challenge.enitt.online TXT   # SecurinetsENIT{5ubd0m41n_hun7_c0mpl3t3}

Decoy & dead ends

  • _dkim returns a plausible DKIM record with no flag — the p= value is just the standard RSA SubjectPublicKeyInfo header (MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA) with no actual key:
    text
    v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA
  • NXDOMAIN / no flag: standard DKIM selectors (default, google, selector1/2, s1/s2, k1...), _mta-sts / mta-sts, _smtp._tls (TLS-RPT), default._bimi (BIMI), DANE/TLSA (_25/_465/_587._tcp.mail), every _service._proto SRV probe, and the apex SPF/CAA.
  • Not a flag: apex TXT is v=spf1 -all; _domainconnect is Cloudflare's auto-added default.

The scanner (the actual solve)

Pure-RFC guessing finds ~7 flags; _verify and auth only fall out of a broader concept sweep. This parallel DoH scanner caught all 9:

python
import concurrent.futures, json, urllib.request

base = "enitt.online"
types = {"TXT":16,"CNAME":5,"A":1,"NS":2,"SRV":33,"MX":15,"TLSA":52,"CAA":257}

rectypes = ["a","aaaa","mx","ns","soa","txt","srv","ptr","cname","dname","caa","tlsa",
            "naptr","cert","sshfp","uri","svcb","https","dnskey","ds","spf","dkim","dmarc","bimi"]
concepts = ["dnssec","axfr","ixfr","zone","transfer","glue","ttl","wildcard","recursion",
            "resolver","cache","spoof","mta-sts","tlsrpt","dane","acme","acme-challenge",
            "autodiscover","autoconfig","verify","auth","reverse","rdns"]
func     = ["mail","smtp","webmail","portal","verify","verify-1","verify-2","final","www",
            "secure","login","sso","auth","api","admin","ns1","ns2","dns"]

words = set()
for group in (rectypes, concepts, func):
    for w in group:
        words.add(w); words.add("_" + w)

def doh(name, t):
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(f"https://dns.google/resolve?name={name}&type={t}", timeout=10) as r:
            return json.load(r)
    except Exception:
        return None

def check(w):
    hits = []
    for tn, tc in types.items():
        d = doh(f"{w}.{base}", tc)
        for a in (d or {}).get("Answer", []):
            hits.append((w, tn, a.get("data", "")))
    return hits

with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=40) as ex:
    for res in ex.map(check, sorted(words)):
        for w, tn, data in res:
            if "SecurinetsENIT" in data:
                print("FLAG", w, tn, data)

Quick verification one-liner

bash
for n in _dmarc mail final _caa _dnssec _axfr _verify auth _acme-challenge; do
  echo -n "$n -> "
  curl -s "https://dns.google/resolve?name=$n.enitt.online&type=TXT" \
    | grep -o 'SecurinetsENIT{[^}]*}'
done

Lessons

  • DNS is an attack surface, not just plumbing. Email-security records (SPF/DKIM/DMARC/MTA-STS/DANE) and validation records (_acme-challenge, verification tokens) routinely leak structure and secrets.
  • Follow the graph. MX targets, CNAME chains and SRV pointers hand you new names for free — no fuzzing needed.
  • Decoys mimic real misconfig. The _dkim placeholder looks legitimate; verify the content (an RSA header with no key is empty).
  • Breadth over a themed wordlist beats a generic subdomain list when the author tells you the names follow "protocols, formats and prefixes."

All flags

text
SecurinetsENIT{m41l_p0l1cy_w34k}
SecurinetsENIT{mx_h1dd3n}
SecurinetsENIT{cn4m3_ch41n}
SecurinetsENIT{c44_4u7h0r17y_l1m173d}
SecurinetsENIT{dn55ec_n07_3n4bl3d}
SecurinetsENIT{20n3_7r4n5f3r_bl0ck3d}
SecurinetsENIT{b451c_dn5_r3c0n}
SecurinetsENIT{5rv_r3c0rd_p1v07}
SecurinetsENIT{5ubd0m41n_hun7_c0mpl3t3}