[ writeup · case #029 ]
DNS
All 9 flags live in DNS records on the enitt.online zone — no web exploitation. The names are protocol- and record-type-themed, reached by guessing DNS/email-security concepts or by following the DNS graph: MX target, CNAME chain, SRV pivot.
TL;DR
All 9 flags live in DNS records on the enitt.online zone — there is no web exploitation. The site sits behind Cloudflare and serves nothing useful. The names are not in common subdomain wordlists; they are protocol-defined / record-type-themed names you reach either by guessing DNS/email-security concepts or by following the DNS graph (MX target, CNAME chain, SRV pivot).
| # | Name | Vector | Flag |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | _dmarc | DMARC record (RFC 7489) | SecurinetsENIT{m41l_p0l1cy_w34k} |
| 2 | mail | target of the MX record | SecurinetsENIT{mx_h1dd3n} |
| 3 | portal → verify-2 → final | CNAME chain | SecurinetsENIT{cn4m3_ch41n} |
| 4 | _caa | CAA-themed name | SecurinetsENIT{c44_4u7h0r17y_l1m173d} |
| 5 | _dnssec | DNSSEC-themed name | SecurinetsENIT{dn55ec_n07_3n4bl3d} |
| 6 | _axfr | zone-transfer-themed name | SecurinetsENIT{20n3_7r4n5f3r_bl0ck3d} |
| 7 | _verify | DNS-verification-themed name | SecurinetsENIT{b451c_dn5_r3c0n} |
| 8 | auth | SRV-record pivot theme | SecurinetsENIT{5rv_r3c0rd_p1v07} |
| 9 | _acme-challenge | ACME DNS-01 (RFC 8555) | SecurinetsENIT{5ubd0m41n_hun7_c0mpl3t3} |
Decoy: _dkim → realistic-looking but fake DKIM record (no flag).
Recon setup
Direct HTTP(S) to the site is blocked/stalled by Cloudflare, but DNS resolution works fine. All queries were made over DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) so no local dig/jq is required:
# one helper
q() { curl -s "https://dns.google/resolve?name=$1&type=$2"; echo; }Key type numbers used: TXT=16, A=1, CNAME=5, MX=15, NS=2, SRV=33, CAA=257, TLSA=52.
First look at the apex:
q enitt.online TXT # v=spf1 -all (strict SPF, no flag)
q enitt.online MX # 10 mail.enitt.online <-- lead #1
q enitt.online NS # carl/ivy.ns.cloudflare.com
q enitt.online HTTPS # Cloudflare SVCB/ECH, no flagThe -all SPF and Cloudflare NS tell us: email-security themed, hosted on Cloudflare, flags hidden in records rather than the website.
The hint, decoded
This points at three families of names:
- Real RFC underscore records —
_dmarc,_acme-challenge, (_domainkey,_mta-sts,_smtp._tls...). - Invented-but-themed underscore concepts —
_caa,_dnssec,_axfr,_verify. - Records you reach by following DNS, not fuzzing — the
mailMX target, theportal → verify-2 → finalCNAME chain, and theauthSRV-pivot name.
The winning move is a parallel DoH scan over a wordlist built from DNS record types + email/DNS-security concepts (each tried as both x and _x), across several record types.
Flag-by-flag
1 — _dmarc → m41l_p0l1cy_w34k
Classic DMARC record. The flag is embedded inside the rua reporting address:
q _dmarc.enitt.online TXT
# "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:SecurinetsENIT{m41l_p0l1cy_w34k}@dmarc.enitt.online" 2 — mail → mx_h1dd3n
The apex MX record points to mail.enitt.online; query that name's TXT:
q enitt.online MX # 10 mail.enitt.online
q mail.enitt.online TXT # SecurinetsENIT{mx_h1dd3n} 3 — portal → verify-2 → final → cn4m3_ch41n
portal is a CNAME; follow the chain to the end. Each hop carries the same flag in TXT:
q portal.enitt.online CNAME # verify-2.enitt.online
q verify-2.enitt.online CNAME # final.enitt.online
q final.enitt.online TXT # SecurinetsENIT{cn4m3_ch41n} 4 — _caa → c44_4u7h0r17y_l1m173d
q _caa.enitt.online TXT # SecurinetsENIT{c44_4u7h0r17y_l1m173d} 5 — _dnssec → dn55ec_n07_3n4bl3d
q _dnssec.enitt.online TXT # SecurinetsENIT{dn55ec_n07_3n4bl3d} 6 — _axfr → 20n3_7r4n5f3r_bl0ck3d
q _axfr.enitt.online TXT # SecurinetsENIT{20n3_7r4n5f3r_bl0ck3d} 7 — _verify → b451c_dn5_r3c0n
q _verify.enitt.online TXT # SecurinetsENIT{b451c_dn5_r3c0n} 8 — auth → 5rv_r3c0rd_p1v07
Themed on the SRV-record "service pivot" idea; the flag sits in TXT:
q auth.enitt.online TXT # SecurinetsENIT{5rv_r3c0rd_p1v07} 9 — _acme-challenge → 5ubd0m41n_hun7_c0mpl3t3
The ACME DNS-01 validation name — the author's "you've found them all" marker:
q _acme-challenge.enitt.online TXT # SecurinetsENIT{5ubd0m41n_hun7_c0mpl3t3}Decoy & dead ends
_dkimreturns a plausible DKIM record with no flag — thep=value is just the standard RSA SubjectPublicKeyInfo header (MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA) with no actual key:text v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA- NXDOMAIN / no flag: standard DKIM selectors (
default,google,selector1/2,s1/s2,k1...),_mta-sts/mta-sts,_smtp._tls(TLS-RPT),default._bimi(BIMI), DANE/TLSA (_25/_465/_587._tcp.mail), every_service._protoSRV probe, and the apexSPF/CAA. - Not a flag: apex
TXTisv=spf1 -all;_domainconnectis Cloudflare's auto-added default.
The scanner (the actual solve)
Pure-RFC guessing finds ~7 flags; _verify and auth only fall out of a broader concept sweep. This parallel DoH scanner caught all 9:
import concurrent.futures, json, urllib.request
base = "enitt.online"
types = {"TXT":16,"CNAME":5,"A":1,"NS":2,"SRV":33,"MX":15,"TLSA":52,"CAA":257}
rectypes = ["a","aaaa","mx","ns","soa","txt","srv","ptr","cname","dname","caa","tlsa",
"naptr","cert","sshfp","uri","svcb","https","dnskey","ds","spf","dkim","dmarc","bimi"]
concepts = ["dnssec","axfr","ixfr","zone","transfer","glue","ttl","wildcard","recursion",
"resolver","cache","spoof","mta-sts","tlsrpt","dane","acme","acme-challenge",
"autodiscover","autoconfig","verify","auth","reverse","rdns"]
func = ["mail","smtp","webmail","portal","verify","verify-1","verify-2","final","www",
"secure","login","sso","auth","api","admin","ns1","ns2","dns"]
words = set()
for group in (rectypes, concepts, func):
for w in group:
words.add(w); words.add("_" + w)
def doh(name, t):
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"https://dns.google/resolve?name={name}&type={t}", timeout=10) as r:
return json.load(r)
except Exception:
return None
def check(w):
hits = []
for tn, tc in types.items():
d = doh(f"{w}.{base}", tc)
for a in (d or {}).get("Answer", []):
hits.append((w, tn, a.get("data", "")))
return hits
with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=40) as ex:
for res in ex.map(check, sorted(words)):
for w, tn, data in res:
if "SecurinetsENIT" in data:
print("FLAG", w, tn, data)Quick verification one-liner
for n in _dmarc mail final _caa _dnssec _axfr _verify auth _acme-challenge; do
echo -n "$n -> "
curl -s "https://dns.google/resolve?name=$n.enitt.online&type=TXT" \
| grep -o 'SecurinetsENIT{[^}]*}'
doneLessons
- DNS is an attack surface, not just plumbing. Email-security records (SPF/DKIM/DMARC/MTA-STS/DANE) and validation records (
_acme-challenge, verification tokens) routinely leak structure and secrets. - Follow the graph. MX targets, CNAME chains and SRV pointers hand you new names for free — no fuzzing needed.
- Decoys mimic real misconfig. The
_dkimplaceholder looks legitimate; verify the content (an RSA header with no key is empty). - Breadth over a themed wordlist beats a generic subdomain list when the author tells you the names follow "protocols, formats and prefixes."
All flags
SecurinetsENIT{m41l_p0l1cy_w34k}
SecurinetsENIT{mx_h1dd3n}
SecurinetsENIT{cn4m3_ch41n}
SecurinetsENIT{c44_4u7h0r17y_l1m173d}
SecurinetsENIT{dn55ec_n07_3n4bl3d}
SecurinetsENIT{20n3_7r4n5f3r_bl0ck3d}
SecurinetsENIT{b451c_dn5_r3c0n}
SecurinetsENIT{5rv_r3c0rd_p1v07}
SecurinetsENIT{5ubd0m41n_hun7_c0mpl3t3}